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Abstract: Online tracking is complex and users find it
challenging to protect themselves from it. While the aca-
demic community has extensively studied systems and
users for tracking practices, the link between the data
protection regulations, websites’ practices of presenting
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), and how users
learn about PETs and practice them is not clear. This
paper takes a multidimensional approach to find such a
link. We conduct a study to evaluate the 100 top EU
websites, where we find that information about PETs
is provided far beyond the cookie notice. We also find
that opting-out from privacy settings is not as easy as
opting-in and becomes even more difficult (if not impos-
sible) when the user decides to opt-out of previously ac-
cepted privacy settings. In addition, we conduct an on-
line survey with 614 participants across three countries
(UK, France, Germany) to gain a broad understand-
ing of users’ tracking protection practices. We find that
users mostly learn about PETs for tracking protection
via their own research or with the help of family and
friends. We find a disparity between what websites offer
as tracking protection and the ways individuals report
to do so. Observing such a disparity sheds light on why
current policies and practices are ineffective in support-
ing the use of PETs by users.
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1 Introduction
Today’s data-intensive web is characterized by the min-
ing and selling of individuals’ data, that enables the
provisioning of customised services but unfortunately
also engenders targeted advertising [9], digital dis-
crimination [18], privacy-invasive algorithmic computa-
tions [24], and a general fuzziness about privacy rights
online. In recent years, internet advertising has become
increasingly tailored to individual users, and is often re-
ferred to as online behavioural advertising or targeted
advertising [19]. Online behavioural advertising occurs
when advertising networks profile users based on their
online activities, and use this profile to show ads that
are more likely to be of interest to a particular user [3].
When users visit a web page, the page’s content can
come from a first- or third-party, where the first-party
is the one the user is explicitly visiting, while the third-
party includes advertising networks, analytics compa-
nies and social networks that contract with first-party
websites [47]. While the tracking of user activities can be
accomplished in a variety of ways, in the simplest form,
the advertiser sets a cookie with a unique identifier on
the user’s computer [42].
Since the enforcement of the GDPR, most EU web-
sites display cookie consent notices, which are expected
to inform users of its cookie use and tracking practices.
However, there is scepticism about the effectiveness of
cookie notice (aka cookie consent/ banner) for track-
ing protection. For example, recent investigations found
that (1) cookie banners on web pages do not necessar-
ily respect people’s choice, in particular, the Do Not
Track option on some browsers only serve to declare
non-consent and are not respected by web pages [46];
(2) approximately half of the websites, in a large-scale
study in Europe, violate the EU cookie directive, by in-
stalling profiling cookies before users consent [75]; and
(3) dark patterns and implied consent are prevalent in
consent management platforms, such that only 11.8%
of the top 10k websites in the UK meet the minimal
GDPR requirements [53]. There is also an overall lack
of usable mechanisms for users to consent or deny the
processing of personal data [16].
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Users can protect themselves from tracking via a
few ways including rejecting the cookie notice, using
builtin browser options, browser blocking extensions or
other tracking protection privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies (PETs). PETs are defined as technologies shaped
according to privacy principles, and covers a broad
range of technologies that are designed for supporting
privacy and data protection [20]. Additionally, a few
browsers are designed with the specific aim of block-
ing tracking activities e.g. Brave browser (brave.com),
Tor Browser (torproject.org), and Duckduckgo Browser
(duckduckgo.com). In these browsers, the blocking mod-
ule is a part of the browser engine and tracking is pre-
vented at the time of parsing the web page (or even be-
fore that when the browser has received contents with
tracking behaviour). The effectiveness of some of these
PETs has been studied in the previous work e.g. in
[25, 27, 51, 74].
The general public opinion in national surveys as
reported in the UK and Europe is that tracking online
is a privacy concern for most citizens [5, 10]. However,
with regards to the use of PETs for tracking protection,
tools and mechanisms have been thought to suffer from
usability issues [16, 44, 66]. For general privacy pro-
tection, interaction aspects such as knowing that PETs
can support privacy [11, 62, 68] and perceiving them
as useful [4, 11, 33], are thought to impact usage of
PETs, among other factors. In addition, it has been
demonstrated that the existing implementation of PETs
and in particular cookie notices do not offer fair prac-
tices. Many dark patterns have been recognised in the
cookie notice of websites, such as with regards to loca-
tion [77] and user control options [46, 50, 53, 77]. More-
over, limited research is available around other privacy-
enhancing information options (beyond cookie notice),
where to our knowledge, existing ones mainly address
US consumers [12, 31, 32].
Contributions: Evidently, while previous studies
have investigated systems and users for tracking prac-
tices, the link between the data protection regulations,
website practices of presenting PETs in the real-world,
and how users learn about PETs and practice them is
not clear. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate the
links between these three aspects (regulations, systems,
and users), as shown in Fig. 1 and by answering these
questions:What are the tracking protection requirements
specified in the law? How do websites inform users about
PETs for tracking protection and how practical those
ways are? How do Internet users learn about PETs for
tracking protection and what PETs do they use?
Fig. 1. Overall scope of the paper
We conduct two user-centric studies across three
countries in Europe with the highest number of Inter-
net users; the UK, Germany and France. We look at
the three aspects of the law, systems, and users and
find the disparities (Fig. 1). In Study 1, we investigate
whether and how the 100 most used European websites
offer tracking protection to users or guide them towards
PETs, as required by the GDPR. Study 1 involves a sys-
tematic analysis of cookie notices, user options beyond
the cookie notice, and an evaluation of the complica-
tions for opting-out. This study contributes to the body
of knowledge in two ways: (a) it studies the complica-
tions of opting-out of previously accepted cookies and
(b) it exhaustively reviews the privacy-related content of
100 top EU websites to find all the PETs and their pop-
ularity. These two contributions have not been studied
in the past. In addition, there is some overlap between
this study and the ones conducted in the past. For exam-
ple, we analyse the cookie notice, control options, and
the implications of opting-out [31, 50, 77]. Our findings
highlight that: (a) opting-out via cookie consent is much
more complicated as opposed to opting-in. More impor-
tantly, we find that opting-out from previously accepted
privacy settings is much harder than the former and (b)
the majority of websites do not offer a fair cookie notice
and rely on browser settings by users to prevent track-
ing. These findings are non-compliant practices, which
to the best of our knowledge are studied for the first
time.
In Study 2, we seek to gain a broad understand-
ing of the methods Internet users employ for tracking
protection online, and how they learn about PETs for
tracking protection. We do so via a survey of Internet
users themselves, across the three countries (UK, Ger-
many, France) with 614 participants. This study reports
on awareness and tracking protection methods employed
by users, noting cross-national and gender differences as
well as discuss their effectiveness. While most websites
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present users with cookie notices, we find that users
mostly learn about PETs for tracking protection via
their own research or family/friends relations. We also
find that UK participants are 34% more likely to not
be aware of (or not remember where they could have
heard of) PETs for tracking than German and French
participants, and women are also 2.7 times more likely
to not be aware than men. In addition, we find that
women are 74% less likely to find PETs via their own
research than men, and German and French participants
are twice more likely than UK participants. We report
on the use of PETs, categorised as technology type for
tracking, noting the preference for browser extensions,
manually opting-out and other categories that include
ones ineffective for tracking protection.
By providing two user-centric studies from different
angles (system evaluation versus user study) and with
distinct methodology, we contribute to a comprehensive
understanding of user tracking protection in the wild.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, first, we explain online tracking and pro-
tection approaches. Next, we explain what are the reg-
ulations for tracking, user rights, and the requirements
for websites to meet. And finally, we introduce the re-
lated work on the human aspects of tracking protection.
2.1 Online Tracking
Online services companies have gradually designed var-
ious ways to collect user data for personalized com-
mercialization. Any device connected to a network can
potentially leak information about its users and en-
vironment. The rise of connected smart devices (such
as smartphones, tablets, and Internet of Things (IoT)
devices) has upgraded the online tracking methods to
a new level. The most common tracking method is
known as cookies. Cookies are small pieces of data (in
text format) that are downloaded to your device when
you visit a website. Other than tracking, cookies are
set for different purposes such as remembering user
information, authentication across devices, analysing
website/application usage, advertising, personalise web-
sites, improving performance and user experience.
Cookies are sent to the client’s computer through
browsers. The browser is responsible to protect cookies
from various threats such as session hijacking, identity
theft and more [15]. Therefore, browsers set different
permission mechanisms to restrict access to cookies to
only eligible parties. The most fundamental cookies pro-
tection policy is the principle browser content protection
mechanism known as “Same Origin Policy (SOP)” [84].
This policy restricts access to cookie content to merely
the domain that generated them. Web server writes
the domain section in the HTTP response header be-
fore sending the cookie to the client’s browser [1]. For
online tracking, cookies are divided into two groups:
First–party and third–party cookies. First-party cook-
ies are set by the website user is visiting, and only that
website can read them (due to the restrictions set by
SOP mechanism). In contrast, third-party cookies are
set by someone other than the owner of the website.
Some web pages may also contain content from other
websites (e.g. Google analytic and Twitter) which may
set their own cookies. In addition, if you share a link to
a page (e.g. Facebook), such a page may set a cookie on
your browser. The visited website has no control over
third-party cookies; however, due to SOP mechanism,
the owner of the third–party cookie has the capability
to read the cookie and collect information from the user.
The user can turn them off in other ways.
In addition to cookies, a website can fingerprint the
user’s browser [57] based on the information collected
through JavaScript (i.e. name of the browser, version,
installed extensions, etc.) and the execution platform
that the client is browsing with (i.e. smartphone make
and model, laptop, screen resolution, etc.). Usually, the
fingerprinting information combined with the cookies
can provide a well–targeted data collection and track-
ing of a user. Previous studies demonstrate that many
top websites have implemented browser fingerprinting
methods to some extend [28]. It is also shown that the
browsers are still unreliable to leak tracking informa-
tion even when the user is browsing through “private
mode” [65] through side-channel attacks. Other tracking
technologies include web beacons, clear GIFs, page tags
and web bugs. They usually take the form of a small,
transparent image that is embedded in a webpage or
email. They work with cookies and capture data like IP
addresses, when the user viewed the page or email, used
device, and some form of location data.
In general, users have some degree of control to pre-
vent online tracking. In the browser, users can turn on
to request “Do Not Track (DNT)” in the HTTP re-
quest. If the server supports this feature, then it will not
send cookies to your browser. In practice, this feature
is not widely implemented [67]. Also, browser vendors
stopped supporting this feature in their products [40].
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Users also can install third–party browser extensions to
detect tracking behaviour when the page is loading in
the browsers. These extensions (e.g. Ghostly and Ad-
Blocker) effectively block a majority of the tracking
cookies. Another way to prevent online tracking is to
install web browsers with the embedded capability to
prevent tracking (e.g. Brave Browser, Tor browser and
more). These browsers are more efficient in blocking the
tracking behaviour since they are implemented as a part
the browser–engine (in contrast to the track–blocking
browser extensions which are installed as a third–party
extension on top of the browser with more restrictions).
2.2 Regulations
The GDPR [79] came into force in 2018, replacing the
old Data Protection Act 1998. It concerns organisations
located in the EU as well as those dealing with EU cit-
izens’ data around the world. Other data protection
regulations include California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) [14], the Chinese Personal Information Secu-
rity Specification (PISS) [56], the Indian Personal Data
Protection Bill (PDP Bill) [30], and the Russian Fed-
eral Law on Personal Data [49]. We focus on the GDPR
since our studies are based on EU websites and users.
The GDPR defines personal data as: “information
that relates to an identified or identifiable individual"
[37]. To satisfy the GDPR’s data protection princi-
ples, rights and obligations, it requires the online ser-
vice providers to tell people that the cookies (or any
other similar tracking technologies) are there, explain
what the cookies are doing and why, and get the per-
son’s consent to use a cookie. The Information Commis-
sioner Officer (ICO) [37] provides extensive guidelines
on law-compliant practices. Among other recommenda-
tions, ICO’s guidelines recommend the service providers
to provide a cookie consent which is separated from
other matters and does not highlight Agree over Reject
and other options, enable the user to withdraw her/his
previously given consent, and do not rely on the browser
settings (or other control mechanisms) as their opt-out
mechanism. Therefore, providing the user with a fair,
independent, and easy mechanism to prevent tracking
or change preferences at any time is required by the law.
2.3 Human Aspects
Among the protection strategies for behavioural adver-
tising and tracking online, as categorised via the protec-
tion principle they rely on [21], transparency and block-
ing are the most researched strategies in user studies.
Transparency refers to enhancing users’ awareness of
the tracking of their activities and data, such as via
MyAdChoices, often accessible via the privacy policy or
the cookie consent notice. Blocking refers to limiting
undesired interactions with third-parties and inhibiting
known tracking mechanisms, and therefore advertising,
such as via blockers as Adblock Plus or Ghostery.
Notice and Choice: Cookie notices of different
sets of websites have been studied before [16, 46, 53, 63,
77], and it has been shown that their design (e.g. po-
sition, choices) substantially impacts user engagement
with them [53, 77]. Similarly, popular designs of cookie
notices do not empower the users in terms of control
options. Reportedly, and on different detests (PC, mo-
bile, etc.), only around 10% of the websites meet the
minimal requirements set by the GDPR [50, 53].
Browser Extensions: Browser extensions vary in
effectiveness and can be distinguished between (1) ad
blocking extensions that limit ads from being loaded
such, as Adblock Plus, and (2) tracker blocking exten-
sions that focus on blocking trackers, such as Ghostery,
Privacy Badger or Disconnect [51]. In the default set-
tings, these extensions may not effectively block ads and
trackers [58] and may need manual configuration for ef-
fective protection [80]. Although some extensions have
improved their usability, their description in the past
was found to be filled with jargon and were not easy for
users to change their settings when the tool interfered
with websites [43].
Other Tools: Limited research has been conducted
to investigate the perception and use of other tracking
protection tools. In a recent study [72], the use and per-
ceptions about five web browsing-related tools including
private browsing, VPNs, Tor Browser, ad blockers, and
antivirus software, have been measured for US users.
The results of such research show that the misconcep-
tions may lead the user to use privacy tools for the
wrong purpose putting them at potential risks.
2.4 Research Gaps
In addition to human dimensions, some of these stud-
ies cover a wide range of other topics including tracking
activities [16, 39, 46, 63, 76], tracking on mobile and
other smart devices [13, 34, 52, 59, 60, 78], legal aspects
[46, 64], and cross-platform evaluations [50, 59, 82]. Var-
ious forms of analysis have been performed via different
case-studies [31, 53, 77], mainly concerning the consent
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notice as the main route of the opt-out and for par-
ticular forms of PETs (e.g. data deletion). In contrast,
the complication of opting-out of previously accepted
privacy settings has not been studied. In addition, lit-
tle research has gone into all forms of PETs provided
by websites in the real-world. Knowing whether or not
opting-out from previously accepted privacy settings is
as easy as opting-in is particularly important since (1)
it is a legal requirement, and (2) certain user groups
may become more privacy-aware over time and should
be able to modify their privacy settings. In addition,
knowing what is the statistics on all forms of PETs of-
fered by websites in the real-world would help to close
some of the gaps between real practices of the vendors
and end-users. In this paper, we address both via our
system studies in Study 1.
Furthermore, knowing that if and what tracking
protection is employed by the users contributes to the
understanding of the real practices. Previous research
has qualitatively elicited protective actions and the use
of privacy technologies in general [57, 68], or queried use
of specific technologies such as browser extensions [45]
and a limited set of web privacy tools [72]. There is
therefore still a gap in research eliciting user responses
via a complete list of tools. This is specifically helpful
when significant disparities are demonstrated when the
two lists (users and websites) are compared. In addi-
tion, while previous research has looked into sources of
information in the security and privacy context in gen-
eral [61], knowing how the users learn about tracking
protection methods specifically may help assess routes
to tracking protection via PETs. In this paper, we ex-
plore both aspects via user studies in Study 2.
3 Study 1: System Studies of
Tracking Protection Methods
3.1 Aim
The usability of the cookie notices and other forms of
tracking protection PETs (e.g. deletion of data) have
been studied via user studies in [31, 77]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, nobody has studied what are all
forms of PETs offered by websites to the users. In [50],
a list of such PETs is presented, though no statistics
are given about the popularity of each method. In addi-
tion, while it has been shown that opting-out is not as
straightforward as accepting the default privacy settings
[31], we don’t know what are the difficulties of opting-
out in case a user changes mind and wants to reject the
previously accepted privacy settings. In this study, we
cover all these blind spots. In addition, tracking prac-
tices of different set of websites have been studied in the
last few years [16, 46, 50, 53, 63, 77]. Such reports show
that the common practices change over time. Hence,
here we study the cookie notices of popular websites
too and contribute to the knowledge of such changes.
As explained earlier, we focus on the GDPR frame-
work which requires the service providers to (i) pro-
vide information about tracking technologies (cookies)
in such a way that the user will see it when they first
visit the service; usually via the cookie consent mech-
anism itself, (ii) separate consent from other matters
and do not bundle into terms and conditions or privacy
notices (iii) do not emphasise Agree (yes, accept, allow,
etc.) over Reject (no, block, decline, etc.) in the cookie
notice, and do not limit the options of the notice to
Agree only, (iv) enable the user to withdraw that previ-
ously given consent at any time with the same ease that
they gave it, and (v) do not rely on browser settings
(or other mechanisms) for the user to set preferences in
relation to the setting of cookies.
In this study, we visit top EU websites and study
them for their privacy consent, opt-out mechanisms and
other PETs under RQ1: “What are the implications of
opting-out of from the privacy consent as well as when
the user changes mind later?", and RQ2: “What are all
sorts of user control options and other PETs offered to
the user to improve their privacy in these websites?".
3.2 Method
We study the top 100 EU websites to observe their
privacy-related content and control options from the
user’s point of view.
Case-study Websites: We chose ‘Europe’ in
Alexa’s region categories to search for top websites in
the EU (Appendix A). The majority of these websites
are also the top websites in the UK, Germany, and
France. When the website required a location and lan-
guage to continue, we chose UK and English. We ex-
cluded non-English websites and redundant ones and
built a data set including 100 websites. These web-
sites varied in their purposes and services, ranging from
search engines and news to gaming, social media, shop-
ping, etc. Our experiments have been conducted be-
tween Sep 2020 to Feb 2021.
Procedure and Measurement: We open each of
the websites on PC on Google Chrome on a Windows
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laptop and observe the following: (i) whether or not
there is a cookie notice? What is the location of the
notice? What are the user options included in the no-
tice? and (ii) what is the number of clicks for rejecting
(opting-out)? What is the number of clicks for opting-
out after accepting the cookie consent? (iii) what are the
other PETs in the privacy-related pages of the website
beyond the cookie consent?
For such observations, we open each website and try
to opt-out of the cookie notice and log the number of
clicks. Then, we clear the browsing history and on the
second visit, we accept the cookies (which is normally
zero or one click). This time, we don’t delete the cookie
settings in the browser, and on the next visit, we try
to opt-out from the previously accepted privacy con-
sent. This may be enabled through a dedicated privacy
icon in the corner of the page, or typically through the
privacy-related links at the bottom of the page. To make
sure that clearing the browsing history is enough for our
purpose, we also ran an experiment via Google Chrome
Incognito mode, Firefox Private mode and Brave– which
is a privacy-oriented browser and blocks all fingerprint-
ing activities. We get consistent results across browsers
and browsing modes which reassure that browser finger-
printing does not influence the results.
For measuring the complications of opting-out, we
count the number of clicks for each target. We perform
those observations ourselves as ‘expert users’ in order
to demonstrate the existing complications in the sim-
plest form. To reduce the errors, we have tested other
routes of opting-out at least twice for each website. Fur-
ther investigations have been performed in case of in-
consistency. During the evaluation, some patterns be-
came more visible after visiting the first few websites
and we became experienced leading to minimising er-
rors. Other studies have adopted more advanced mea-
surement methods (e.g. all user action such as scrolling,
reading, clicking, etc.) for assessing other aspects of
user privacy and via recruiting participants e.g. [31, 77],
which we plan to explore in the future.
Next, we clear the browsing history again and open
each website and follow the related privacy links in or-
der to find further privacy options, links, and tools of-
fered to the user. This is a tedious manual process and
prone to errors. To improve the accuracy of our content
analysis, we first try to find the privacy-related pages
via the privacy consent. If we could not do so, we click
on the privacy-related pages (e.g. privacy/cookie pol-
icy, interest-based ads, EU privacy rights) at the bot-
tom of the page. After we build a list of the identified
PETs, we cross-check all the items by searching our key-
words in the privacy-related pages of each website again.
This process is done independently by two researchers.
A more detailed template that was followed for our web-
site analysis is provided in the Appendix.
Limitations: Since in this paper we have a mul-
tidimensional purpose (system studies as well as user
studies), some of our methodological choices have been
influenced by such purpose. For observing the number
of clicks for rejecting cookies and opting-out after ac-
cepting privacy settings, we simplify our experiment by
considering an ‘expert user’. We don’t consider other
factors such as difficulty in finding the opt-out routes,
other user actions (e.g. scroll, filling text, etc.) and the
spent time (e.g. similar to [31]). Most of the privacy
options are normally found through the privacy-related
links at the bottom of the webpage presented with small
fonts. We assume our expert user knows where to look
at and only count the number of clicks. In doing so,
we show that even under that simplified test condition,
opting-out is much more complicated than accepting
the default settings. We acknowledge that by simpli-
fying our experiments, we potentially lose further in-
formation about the usability metrics such as font size,
colours, etc. However, we highlight that even under such
a testing setup, dark patterns can be observed and our
approach doesn’t invalidate our findings.
In the future, we plan to run experiments with
real users and measure the difficulties that they expe-
rience in tracking protection. In addition, we conduct
this study manually since we want to investigate these
websites from the user’s point of view. This approach
is not salable for large-scale studies. Now that we have
the protection PETs keywords, we plan to use auto-
mated algorithms to conduct studies at a larger sample
set in our future research. We conduct our experiments
on PC browsers and do not investigate the differences on
other platforms e.g. mobile browsers and mobile apps.
Previous research has shown that privacy practices in-
deed differ across platforms [50]. We leave this as future
work too. Finally, due to the dimensions of our exper-
iments, we limit the scope of our paper by focusing on
the GDPR only. While there might be some applica-
bility to other legal frameworks, this remains as future
work to investigate the same issues according to other
data protection regulations such as the CCPA.
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Fig. 2. Opting-out when website visited for the fist time vs. Opting-out of previously accepted settings, Left: Number of websites for
each click count, Right: the distribution of number of clicks. Websites with no opt-out options are excluded from the right plot.








Table 1. Cookie notice control options in top 100 EU websites
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Cookie Notice
As it can be seen in Table 1, 5 websites did not have any
cookie notice, 15 only notified the user without any con-
trol options. 22 websites presented their cookie notice
with one option only: Accept (agree, ok, yes, I under-
stand, etc.). 44 websites included other options (more
information, settings, customise my choices, etc.), but
highlighted Accept over other options. Only 14 websites
presented a cookie notice which included another op-
tion in addition to Accept where Accept was not high-
lighted. However, only three of them allowed to reject
as easy as accept. Apart from the latter category, all
the other practices are non-compliant with the law and
do not meet the minimum requirements provided by the
GDPR [37]. This rate is in the same range as what was
found in the previous work [50, 53].
These cookie notices were displayed in different
formats (in-page vs overlay), sizes, colours and fonts.
The location varied across these websites, 15 websites
showed the notice on top of the page, 48 websites pre-
sented in the lower part of the page, and 31 websites had
their cookie notice in the middle of the page. 1 website
presented the notification on the right side of the page.
Previous research [77] shows that users are more likely
to engage with a notice positioned in the lower left side
of the screen in PC. This practice was observed in 3
of our websites only. However, around one third of our
websites showed their cookie notices in the middle of
the page (and mainly as an overlay that required user
engagement before using the website). This practice has
not been tested in [77] and potentially would engage the
users highly. This remains as future work to be explored.
3.3.2 Opting-Out
Fig. 2 demonstrates the number of clicks for opting-
out and websites (left) and the distribution (right) of
the number of clicks. These plots demonstrate two test
conditions: (a) opting-out of privacy consent when the
website is visited for the first time and (b) when the
user changes mind and wants to opt-out of previously
accepted privacy settings. Out of the 100 websites, 5
did not have any cookie notice at all, 34 did not al-
low to opt-out through the cookie notice (shown by not
possible in the left plot), and 46 would not provide an
opt-out option in case of changing mind. For the remain-
ing websites, it would take the user to opt-out from the
cookie notice by 3 clicks on average. If the user accepts
the cookie notice, and changes mind later, it would take
them 6 clicks on average to opt-out. We observed that
even when the number of clicks was low (e.g. 2 or 3) for
opting-out, there are other complications for the users
to opt-out. For example, they have to scroll down to
find the reject option and or go to a new page for the
desired privacy settings. These action items would take
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Fig. 3. Example of opting-out via cookie notice and existing violations (Accept is highlighted and cookies are pre-selected).
much more time vs opting-in. These results show that
opting-out (under any circumstances) is not as easy as
opting-in which normally requires the user zero or at
most one click. This is another non-compliant practice
that was seen on most of our websites.
When trying to opt-out of previously accepted pri-
vacy settings, the majority of the websites required the
user to click on the privacy links at the bottom of the
page. In some cases, the cookie notice would pop-up af-
ter clicking the privacy link, and in other cases, it would
take the user to further pages. Only in three cases, there
was a privacy icon presented as an overlay design (still in
small size) at the bottom of the page which was visible
to the user all the time while on the website. In addition,
we found the same dark patterns of the cookie notices
(e.g. highlighting Accept over Reject) in other areas of
many websites. For example, when the user tries to opt-
out via the cookie notice, in the next stages, multiple
options (accept, reject, more info, etc.) are presented
with similar nudging patterns (Fig. 3).
3.3.3 Available PETs
From the user’s point of view, it is important to ex-
amine what further privacy-enhancing options are pro-
vided by online services. By following the related pri-
vacy links and options available in the privacy-related
pages of each website (including the links in the cookie
notice), we recognised that most websites provide two
different pages: cookie policy and privacy policy, among
other related pages. Table 2 shows these PETs and their
popularity among the websites.
Contacting service provider: Almost all web-
sites provided information for contacting them via some
form of electronic communication e.g. email addresses,
and online forms or links dedicated to privacy matters.
Some offered other ways of communications for privacy
Category no. of websites
Contacting service provider 94
Browser settings 90
Initiatives 73
Opting-out of 3rd party websites 66
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) 53
Website & account settings 34
Browser add-on 25
Mobile & app settings 21
Table 2. PETs offered by top 100 EU websites
purposes e.g. via sending an SMS including “STOP" to
opt-out from receiving the advertisement.
Browser settings: The majority of these websites
recommended that the user can prevent tracking by
changing the browser settings including activating Do
Not Track (DNT), deleting cookies manually, and pro-
viding links to information about how to modify settings
in certain browsers such as IE, Firefox, Chrome, Safari,
on PC and mobile devices. Note that according to the
GDPR, relying on the user to modify the browser set-
tings for tracking protection is not law-compliant.
Initiatives: A large number of the websites re-
ferred the user to the related initiatives includ-
ing European Interactive Digital Advertising Al-
liance (EDAA) websites (e.g. edaa.eu or youronline-
choices.com), Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance
(DAA, aboutads.info, youradchoices.com, and its mo-
bile version: youradchoices.com/appchoices), Canadian
(youradchoices.ca) and Japanese (ddai.info), Interactive
Advertising Bureau (IAB) and its European version,
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI, networkadver-
tising.org), aboutcookies.org, allaboutcookies.org, pri-
vacyshield.gov, cookielaw.org, europa.eu, cookiecen-
tral.com, etc. This requires the user to go out of the
website and visit other sources to improve their privacy.
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Opting-out of 3rd-party websites: More than
half of the websites provided information and links
about their partners and guided the user to opt-out of
them via their own website or the third party website.
This included information and/or links to big compa-
nies such as Google (and Youtube), Facebook (and In-
stagram), and Twitter for the user to adjust their online
privacy settings through these websites. This normally
includes a long list of third parties and unless there is an
option such as “Reject all", is not a practical method.
Information Commissioner’s Office: Around
half of the websites provided information, links, and
email address of ICO (ico.org.uk), explaining how the
user can find more information about online privacy on
the ICO website and/or report certain violations and
complaints to the ICO. Similar to the above categories,
this also requires the user to exit the website and visit
another website to improve their privacy.
Website & account settings: Around one third
of the websites advised the user to change privacy pref-
erences via the website privacy dashboard settings and
user account. Some provided links, and some only men-
tioned this as an option. A few websites advised the user
to stop using their services by deleting or deactivating
the user account in order to protect their privacy.
Browser add-on: A quarter of the websites pro-
vided information (and in some cases links) to privacy-
enhancing extensions to improve privacy. This was
mainly a link to Google Analytics Opt-out Add-on.
Ghostery was mentioned on one website.
Mobile & app settings: Some websites provided
information and links about how modifying mobile de-
vices and apps settings to change privacy preferences
can improve privacy. Some of these websites provided
extensive instructions such as: “When using a mobile
device, you can opt-out of receiving interest-based ad-
vertising by selecting ‘Privacy’ and then ‘Advertising’ in
the Settings of your Apple iPhone or iPad, or the “Opt-
out of Ads Personalisation” in the Google Settings on
your Android device. You may also be able to reset the
unique identifier that Google uses for online behaviour-
based advertising (referred to as an “Advertising ID”) in
the Settings on your Apple or Android device.)". Some
other websites only mentioned that this is an option
without further explanations and links.
As it can be seen, a wide range of options are offered
to the users; supposedly to improve their privacy. Find-
ing these options requires the user to go way beyond
the first page of the website and even out of the web-
site (and to other websites). We observed that the user
has to read through multiple text-heavy privacy-related
pages to be able to find the above and practice them.
Some of these links are broken and the readability of
content for a non-expert user is debatable. The usabil-
ity of a subset of the above items has been studied in
prior work [31, 32]. We plan to conduct another study
to measure the accessibility and usability of the full list
in our future work.
Furthermore, this study explores the top 100 EU
websites. It is likely that these popular websites are
well-equipped and potentially have better resources to
focus on law-complaint practices. Potentially less pop-
ular websites with less human and financial resources
would employ less adequate practices leading to worse
tracking activities and fewer user control options. How-
ever, bigger companies have the financial resources to
pay for penalty fees of potential breaches as we have
seen in the last few years [35]. We leave this as future
work to be explored.
4 Study 2: User Inquiry of
Tracking Protection Methods
4.1 Aim
With regards to the use of PETs for tracking protec-
tion, previous research has looked into the usability of
notice and choice and browser extensions [31, 43, 77] or
into mental models of tracking [45], with limited men-
tion of other factors [68]. Yet in general, beyond tracking
protection (and a single tracking protection study [68]),
other factors have also been shown to determine the
use and deployment of PETs, including awareness of
PETs and knowing that they can help [11, 62]. There-
fore, to gain a better understanding of the use of partic-
ular PETs for tracking protection, in Study 2 we investi-
gate (1) how individuals learn about PETs for tracking
protection, and (2) what PETs they use, in an online
survey. In particular, unawareness of privacy technolo-
gies has been highlighted as a deterrent to the adoption
of PETs in previous research [11, 62, 68]. We, therefore,
investigate awareness of PETs under RQ1 “Are indi-
viduals aware of PETs for third-party tracking (TPT)
protection? How do individuals learn about PETs for
tracking protection, given their gender and country dif-
ferences?" In addition, we investigate use behaviour in
RQ2 via “What PETs do individuals use for TPT pro-
tection?". Note that we focused on third-party track-
ing as the more intrusive tracking method, compared to
first-party tracking.
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Country N Mean Age Gender
#F #M #N
United Kingdom 209 35.78 109 100 0
Germany 202 29.21 100 100 2
France 203 27.29 98 99 6
Note: for gender, F refers to female, M to male, and N to
non-binary
Table 3. Participant Characteristics
4.2 Method
We conducted an online survey with N = 614 partici-
pants. In this section, we detail the survey methodology.
Participants: We sampled N = 614 participants,
N = 209 from the UK, N = 202 from Germany (GE)
and N = 203 France (FR). We chose these three coun-
tries as they have the highest number of internet users in
Europe [70], and therefore a high number of users poten-
tially exposed to online tracking. We recruited partici-
pants via Prolific Academic, a crowd-sourcing platform
whose data quality has good reproducibility [55]. While
the study lasted within 20 minutes, participants were
renumerated at a rate of £7.5 per hour, as advised by
the Prolific platform.
The study was balanced by the number of partic-
ipants in each country and gender, as we noted from
previous research that UK individuals may exhibit dif-
ferent privacy behaviour, with respect to use of PETs,
compared to other countries [11], and women may also
engage in different protection practices compared to
men [54]. Table 3 provides a summary of the demo-
graphic details.
Procedure: The survey study was designed as fol-
lows. We provided (1) a consent form (as described in
the Ethics section below), (2) a demographics ques-
tionnaire, (3) we elicited participants’ understanding
of third-party tracking, (4) provided a note on privacy
technologies and elicited how participants usually learn
about PETs, and (5) queried of PETs usage. Although
the survey was designed in English, it was proofread by
the authors, and three of their acquaintances who are
not experts in the topic. In addition, the survey was
piloted on Prolific platform across the three countries,
where we invited the pilot participants to comment on
the survey, thereby facilitating iterative enhancements.
Survey questionnaires: Participants were pro-
vided with a series of questions as detailed in the pre-
vious section. In this section, we detail the questions
on elicitation of means of learning about PETs and the
use of PETs, as the main focus of this study. We also
provide this verbatim in the Appendix.
Awareness of PETs. To bring participants’ own un-
derstanding of tracking to the fore, we first asked partic-
ipants to write about their understanding of third-party
tracking (TPT) as a way of inducing their mental pic-
ture. We then noted that privacy technologies, tools or
features may be a means of protecting against track-
ing and asked participants to select how they learnt
about such privacy technology, tools or features that
can help to protect from third-party tracking online.
We provided a 5-option closed-ended question, with the
options (1) ‘friend/social contact recommendation’ (2)
‘work/school recommendation’ (3) ‘privacy/cookie pol-
icy of a website’ (4) ‘technology blog recommendation’
(5) ‘news’, as well as, an ‘other’ box to write in other
sources or that they ‘don’t know’ of PETs for track-
ing protection. We chose these options with inputs from
previous research findings, in particular, the channel of
communication via which individuals would like to learn
about PETs [68] as well as their perception of social in-
fluence and support from others as encouraging the use
of PETs [11, 26].
Use of PETs. To assess the usage of PETs, we pro-
vided participants with an extensive list of PETs, gath-
ered from three sources: (1) PETs named by a simi-
lar group of participants in recent research (such as
the 26 PETs identified in [11]); (2) PETs named in
cookie policies, such as Google opt-out add-on and ini-
tiatives (youronlinechoices.com) or device settings [50];
and (3) PETs suggested by privacy experts. These PETs
include, for instance, privacy-oriented browsers (such
as Brave, Dooble browser), or extensions (such as Ad-
Guard, Trace, Crumble). Together. these made up a
list of 57 PET options. We note that the items in (1),
that is the 26 general PETs, may not all protect from
tracking. However, we wanted to cater for participants
who may use certain technologies, with the assumption
that they provide useful protection from tracking. These
PETs were also named by participants recruited from a
similar sample pool [11].
Ethics: This research includes collecting data from
users and had full approval from [anonymous] Univer-
sity’s Ethics Committee before the research commenced.
In addition, we designed our user studies according to
Menlo Report to conduct responsible research in com-
puter science [2]. Participation in this study was com-
pletely voluntary and anonymous and our participants
could drop out of it at any stage since it was con-
ducted online. The first page of the survey gave informa-
tion about the study, letting participants know that the
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Fig. 4. % of participants learning about PETs for tracking protec-
tion via different methods.
study was anonymous, that participation was voluntary
and explicitly asked for opt-in consent for participation.
Limitations: This study relied on self-reports,
which is however widely employed for eliciting user re-
sponses in privacy and security user studies. We did not
choose a representative sample from Prolific’s sample
pool, since at the time of running the study, that fea-
ture was only available for UK participants.
However, we note the difference in mean age across
country groups as a limitation. We also note that there
was no significant difference in age between men and
women in all three countries. Future studies may en-
deavour towards a representative sample or to recruit
from a different sample population. The study was lim-
ited to understanding usage and the path to awareness
of PETs. However, the elicitation of PETs usage em-
ployed a similar question as previously used, and the list
of PETs contained elements named by a similar group
of participants themselves [11].
While laypersons may not be aware of all the items
in the list, we expected them to identify those they
use and the study was piloted with non-experts, as de-
scribed in the Procedure section above. Overall, more
research can be done into how paths to awareness and
how awareness translate to the usage of PETs.
While the survey was piloted in the respective coun-
tries to invite participants feedback (on structure and
comprehension), we note as a limitation that a good
command of English could be correlated with higher
experience in IT and security that we did not mea-
sure/elicit. The survey was written in English, and run
across the UK, Germany and France.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Awareness of PETs
We investigate RQ1 “Are individuals aware of PETs and
how do they learn about PETs for tracking protection,
given their gender and country differences?" We collated
how participants learnt about PETs for tracking protec-
tion. While we provided participants with a close-ended
question, we found additional recurring themes in par-
ticipants’ responses in the ‘other’ option. For example,
some participants responded to the ‘other’ option with
P33 “My brother who is an IT expert" or P396 “my fa-
ther taught me about them". We, therefore, extended the
‘friend/social contact’ category pertaining to relations
and social contacts to include ‘family’.
Other responses also included responses pointing to
participants’ own research to seek for PETs via inter-
net searches, or finding information in webpages, such
as P44 “Found it myself through researching" or P123
“Reddit, Internet". We collated these together with the
‘tech blog recommendation’ category and renamed the
category to own ‘research’. In addition, a few partici-
pants responded to finding PETs via browser options
or technology information, as P336 “I think I discov-
ered privacy options in browsers by myself when I was
15" or P92 “reading the brave browser info when in-
stalled brave [sic]". We coded these into the new theme
‘tech info’. While the ‘don’t know’ theme (correspond-
ing with 44.6% participants) refers to participants who
are not aware of PETs for tracking protection (as set
in the questionnaire), we can additionally assume that
it also contains those who do not remember how they
became aware of such PETs, as a couple of participants
said that they do not remember.
We provide a summary of ways individuals learn
about PETs in Fig. 4. We note noticeable patterns,
such as (1) a larger percentage of women said that they
did not know compared to men, in all three countries;
(2) finding PETs via one’s own research was the most
named approach of becoming aware of PETs among men
in all countries, followed with learning via the support
of friends and family which is also the preferred method
for women; and (3) privacy policies only make up a small
% of participant responses. We only report on men and
women without non-binary gender. This is because the
study has an almost equal number of men and women
participants, thereby aiding comparison, but only has 8
participants reporting non-binary gender.
To look into the statistical effects of gender and
country differences, we computed three binary logis-
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Fig. 5. Number of participants using different categories of PETs
& how they learn about them.
tic regressions, one for each of the two most popular
ways participants learnt about PETs (‘own research’
and ‘friend/family’) and one for ‘don’t know’, with tar-
get variable being one of the ways and country and gen-
der as predictors. We chose regression models over X2
tests, as we would need a larger number of (X2) tests
with multiple comparison corrections, given our data
structure.
The model with ‘own research’ as target variable is
significant with χ2(3) = 45.977, p < .001, R2 is between
10% (Cox & Snell) and 15% (Nagelkerke), where women
are about 74% less likely to do their own research, and
both German and French about twice more likely than
UK participants. The model has an accuracy of 78%.
The model with ‘friend/family’ as target variable is not
significant, while the model with ‘don’t know’ as target
variable and country and gender as predictors, is signif-
icant with χ2(3) = 70.135, p < .001, R2 is between 11%
(Cox & Snell) and 15% (Nagelkerke), where women are
about 2.7 times more likely to not be aware of PETs/not
remember, and both German and French about 66% less
likely than UK participants. The model has an accuracy
of 64%.
4.3.2 Use of PETs
We investigate RQ2 “What PETs do individuals use for
TPT protection?" We compute the frequency of men-
tions of each of the 57 PETs. We report on the PETs
used by at least 10 participants, that is the 45 most used
PETs, in Fig. 6. Browser extensions, such as Adblock,
AdblockPlus and UBlock, are among the most popular
PETs used for tracking protection. The popularity of
browser extensions is consistent with the previous re-
search; extensions are popular and often also used for
UX rather than privacy [45]. However, browser exten-
sions, as tracking protection recommendation, was only
seen in 25 out of 100 websites (and mainly for Google
Analytics Opt-out Add-on) in Study 1. The methods
reported by our participants for tracking protection are
clearly distant from those websites offer in Study 1 and
there is a disparity between legal requirements and real-
world practices. We group the PETs into 8 categories as
shown in Table 4 and demonstrate the popularity of
each category in Fig. 5. The categories refer to the type
of protection for tracking and the design of the PET,
such as whether they are browser extensions, privacy-
oriented browsers, network tools, inbuilt browser set-
tings, blocking software, private browsing, and manual
opt-out. ‘Others’ correspond to PETs that do not be-
long to the previous categories. We find that extensions
and manual opt-out, are the two most used PETs cat-
egories for tracking protection, with ‘others’ category
taking third place – where ‘others’ includes technolo-
gies that are clearly not effective for tracking such as
Paypal.
We note that the study participants may not be
aware of the (in-)effectiveness (or the varied effective-
ness across PETs), of the tracking protection meth-
ods that they use. In particular, some browser exten-
sions may not effectively block ads and trackers [58]
and may need manual configuration for effective pro-
tection [80]. In reality, malicious extension behaviour
in browser extensions is a serious threat. Despite going
under substantial vetting processes, some browser ex-
tensions downloaded from the official repositories (such
as Chrome Web Store in Google Chrome and Add–ons
in Firefox) are prone to malicious behaviour [41]. More-
over, some of the tracker–blocking extensions may im-
plement backdoors for their own tracking activities (i.e.
signing a contract with specific advertisement compa-
nies to allow tracking from their URL while blocking
their competitors [29]).
The manual deletion of cookies from the browser
after each time of browsing is not a feasible solution
for users. However, users have the option to browse us-
ing private browsing (called Private mode in Firefox,
Incognito in Chrome, InPrivate Browsing in Edge). In
this setting, the cookies and history of the browsers will
be automatically deleted when the browser is closed.
This is useful when users want to stay stealthy in the
context of their local device (i.e. smartphone, laptop
or PC). However, private browsing would leak informa-
tion about the user if a motivated attacker investigates
the side–channel information such as deletion traces and
dump database data [65].
For blocking software, in particular, using a VPN,
the user identity (i.e. the specifics of the browser and
network–related information such as IP address) is hid-
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Type Technology
Extensions AdBlock, Adblock PLus, UBlock, NoScript, Ghostery, AdGuard DoNotTrackMe, Privacy Badger,
Google Analytics Opt-out add-on, DuckDuckGo plugin, Firefox Facebook container,
Firefox Lockwise, HTTPS Everywhere extension
Privacy-oriented Browsers Brave, DuckDuckGo browser, Tor Browser and Microsoft Edge
Network Tools Proxy, Virtual Machine, HTTPS, VPN
Browser Settings Chrome Canary (builtin): Set Block third-party tracking, IE (builtin): Set Send DNT Request,
IE (builtin): Set Block Third-Party Cookies, Safari (builtin): Set Prevent cross-site tracking,
Firefox (builtin): Set Strict content blocking, Chrome (builtin): Set Send Do Not Track Request
Standalone Blocking Software Anti-Malware, Kaspersky, Anti-Spyware, Firewall
Private Browsing Private browsing or incognito mode option in modern browsers
Manual Opt-out Clear cookies or opt-out of cookies, Clear browsing history, opt-out website: optout.aboutads.info,
opt-out website: YourAdChoices - Youronlinechoices.com, Switch off location tracking,
Opt-out of receiving emails or newsletters
Others Paypal instead of internet banking, device/mobile/app settings, Pseudonyms, Password manager,
Private social network, Encryption tools, Flash player privacy settings
Table 4. The categorization of PETs technologies employed by our participants.
den from the website server through a private server
that the user is already connected to. From the server’s
point of view, they are responding to the requests sent
from the private server, not the user [6]. The core prob-
lem with this configuration is the trust issues between
the user and the private server. The private server is
still able to track the user and browsing behaviour. This
tracking data can be stored in the private server and
sold to third–parties and/or controlled by malicious en-
tities [23]. Thus, there must be a minimum level of trust
between the user and the private server.
Built–in browser options refer to technologies that
prevent tracking of the user without the need to install
any third–party extensions or software packages (e.g.
Anti–spyware and Anti–virus products). The track
blocking starts at the time of webpage request sent
by the browser. For instance, a request for loading a
tracking JavaScript script is not sent from the browser
at all. This will give the users the benefit of load-
ing the webpage faster, saving bandwidth and blocking
the trackers at the same time [7]. The technologies for
this category fall into two groups: first, the privacy–
oriented browsers (e.g. Brave Browser (brave.com),
Tor Browser (torproject.org) or Duckduckgo Browser
(duckduckgo.com/app) that have implemented privacy–
preserving technologies in their browsing engines [69].
Second, the mainstream browsers are embedding a track
blocker module in their products. For instance, Apple
Safari has recently announced to include a smart track–
blocking in Safari [71], and Mozilla Firefox have de-
veloped a track blocking module in recent releases [8].
The drawbacks of these technologies have not been re-
searched extensively yet. In addition, relying on browser
settings as the main method of tracking protection is not
law-compliant.
We believe the real–world competence of these tech-
nologies in online tracking has not been thoroughly in-
vestigated yet. The effectiveness of other methods and
especially those provided in websites through various
initiatives have not been studied in depth too. We plan
to conduct dedicated system and user studies to inves-
tigate these in our future work.
5 Discussion
In this section, based on our results, we provide rec-
ommendations for various stakeholders including service
providers, PETs designers, end-users, and regulators.
5.1 Recommendations
Our findings across gender and country can support the
designers and privacy educators to consider the diversity
of behaviours in terms of finding PETs – hence to not
only provide information out there but to guide different
user groups according to their preferences, and support
accessibility of PETs within users’ preferred route. Re-
searchers may also engage users in participatory studies
to reveal what interventions (and their characteristics)
may be more suitable for facilitating access.
Service providers: In Study 1 we found a few dark
patterns and violations in the presentation of the cookie
notices and user opt-out routes, some of which have been
shown by others too. More specifically, previous research
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has shown that the cookie notice is not effective since
user choice is not even taken into consideration. In some
cases, cookies are placed before the presentation of the
cookie notice [46, 50, 64]. These non-compliant practices
may be on purpose and/or due to careless implemen-
tation patterns such as copying and pasting program
codes which contain trackers. Another example is when
a website detects some form of track-blocking on the
user device and refuses to provide services to the user
unless the blocker is turned off. In view of all of that,
we recommend that websites carefully go through their
privacy practices and aim for lawful, fair, and ethical
processes.
PETs designers: Study 2 reported a list of meth-
ods that may vary in their effectiveness of tracking pro-
tection, unbeknownst to users. In addition, while users’
own research may be the most reported way of becom-
ing aware of protection methods overall, this may not
apply to all countries and gender, as observed in Study
2. In fact, becoming aware via social connections is a
close second preferred method.
We recommend that PETs designers make it clear
what protection is offered by particular PETs, in a
language that matches users’ limited understanding of
tracking and cookies and help to clear out inaccurate
mental models [45, 48, 83], as well as spell out what
protections are not provided by particular PETs. This
will help deal with misconceptions that cookies behave
like viruses, and expecting anti-virus software to pro-
tect them from tracking. Designers also ought to be
aware of gender and country differences in how indi-
viduals learn about PETs, and be able to cater for
different groups. While more research into the accessi-
ble means of communicating PETs information to users
is needed (so as not to rely solely on users to con-
duct their research, where the burden is on users),
designers can already consider the use of social net-
works, since apart from this paper, other researchers
have also pointed to the impact of social influence on
the use of PETs [11, 26]. It would also be helpful to
establish PETs repositories, and make vetted recom-
mendations more accessible to the lay user. Existing
lists include that of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s
(eff.org/pages/tools) or the European Agency for Cyber
Security’s (enisa.europa.eu/publications/privacy-tools-
for-the-general-public) (ENISA) list of privacy tools for
the general public.
Users: End–users have a variety of options to re-
strict and/or block online tracking activities. Overall,
we recommend that the users consider the privacy–
oriented browsers over other options. These products
are usually developed efficiently based on the estab-
lished web–engines. For instance, Brave Browser has
been developed based on Chromium, the open–source
version of Google Chrome. Therefore, it has the effi-
ciency capabilities of webpage rendering and JavaScript
execution (e.g. V8 JavaScript Engine and Blink browser
engine) and the ability to install WebExtensions-based
browser extensions. Meanwhile, the user will be pro-
tected against tracking with a built–in track blocker
with minimum impact on the page loading time. Other
ways to improve user privacy experience is via educa-
tion (e.g. free online courses, and reliable sources such
as the ICO [37]), managing privacy settings across their
user accounts, and practising their data privacy right via
contacting service providers and other related entities.
Users may also be encouraged to openly share about
their experiences of privacy protection online, via social
networks or other ways, so as to scale the potential im-
pact of social influence and trusting connections on the
use of PETs. This would also facilitate the development
of more privacy-empowered online communities.
5.2 Online Privacy Regulations
Our findings highlight that people across gender and
country indeed perceive and protect their privacy differ-
ently, and hence regulators should identify those needs
leading to more effective and sometimes distinctive reg-
ulations. Another dimension is the purpose of tracking.
Evidently, the tracking industry managed to impact po-
litical decisions by deploying effective micro-targeting
advertisements. The regulators should consider updat-
ing laws to address the specific misuses of collected
tracking data. For instance, the laws should be clear on
the micro-tracking advertisement with political contents
[22]. We discuss that instead of general regulations, mul-
tiple dimensions should be taken into account for more
effective legislation. Such dimensions include tracking
across demographics, nationalities, and purposes. ICO
has already started setting specific guidelines for dif-
ferent key data protection themes concerning children,
age, and AI [36]. Such efforts should be extended to
more contexts.
The research community has now well researched
the dark patterns that exist in common practices by
vendors. Our results demonstrate that the PETs offered
by the websites, those that users employ and the ways
that they learn about them do not match. In addition,
very few websites follow law-compliant approaches. One
might wonder how better enforcement of data protec-
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tion regulations is possible when such a wide range of
violations exists in the real-world. As mentioned before,
many companies have been and are violating the data
protection regulations and pay the penalty fees [35].
There are several national data protection authorities
across the world who support the enforcement of pri-
vacy laws. For instance, ICO in the UK covers a few
legislation including the GDPR [38]. Among the other
services that such data protection authorities can offer
(e.g. report a breach, make a complaint, and pay fees),
they provide a set of technical guidelines translating le-
gal requirements to technical terms (e.g. cookie notice
requirements [37]).
We envision that user privacy will become signif-
icantly concerning on other platforms such as mobile
websites and apps and IoT devices as recognised by pre-
vious research [50, 78]. Some efforts have been recently
made for app privacy by companies such as Apple and
Google. Here, we explain Apple’s App Tracking Trans-
parency (ATT) policy [17] as an example of industry
self-regulation. Apple’s recent ATT policy, on iOS 14.5
(26 April 2021), requires developers to ask for permis-
sion when they use certain information from other com-
panies’ apps and websites for advertising purposes, even
if they already have user consent. This is a significant
effort into making app tracking activities more limited,
though, it comes with its own complications. For exam-
ple, it means iPhone owners are now seeing much more
privacy prompts as they continue using their regular
apps, each one asking for permission to “track your ac-
tivity across other companies’ apps and websites", with
two options on the notices as “Ask App not to Track",
and “Allow", in addition to the app name to be shown in
the Tracking menu within user broader iOS Privacy set-
tings, for further manual settings. Furthermore, it may
be challenging for Apple to actually enforce parts of
its ATT policy such as restricting the app to use other
user identifiers (such as hashed email addresses). In-
terestingly, some recent reports show that 96% of US
users opt-out of app tracking introduced in iOS 14.5
[73]. Since the enforcement of this policy is relatively
recent, various aspects of its effectiveness in improving
user privacy remains unresearched. Google is also work-
ing on a similar privacy feature for its Google Play Store
and apps, however, the details of this plan are not clear
yet [81].
In view of all of the above, we believe that the re-
search community should continue to research this field
and especially the blind spots such as data concerning
‘marginalised user groups’ on all platforms i.e. PC, mo-
bile and IoT. Through strong collaboration between the
regulators and researchers, a proactive approach can be
taken into account in order to protect user privacy more
efficiently; allowing all user groups to use online tech-
nologies without risk and fear.
6 Conclusion
Online tracking is messy and complex from all perspec-
tives i.e. tracking methods, protection technologies, reg-
ulations, and user dimensions. Privacy-enhancing tools
and methods can help Internet users protect themselves
on online platforms. However, the complexity in the
regulations, their implementation, and enforcement, as
well the wide range of tools available for the users to
be employed make it difficult for them to adopt such
tools effectively. To shed light on the disparities between
the legal requirements for tracking protection, websites
and user practices, we conducted multi-dimensional re-
search. We designed experiments to investigate protec-
tion from online tracking via conducting two studies
looking into websites and users, respectively. In Study
1, we first looked at cookie notice presentation and con-
trol options in 100 top EU websites, then we evaluated
the difficulties to opt-out in two situations: 1) when the
user visits the websites for the first time, and 2) when
the user changes mind and what to opt-out of previously
accepted privacy settings. In Study 2, we surveyed 614
users in the UK, Germany, and France and asked them
if and how they protect from online tracking. We also
asked them how do they learn about these protection
methods (e.g. via research, friends and family, etc.).
We showed that opting-out is not as straightforward
as accepting the default privacy settings, and becomes
even more complicated when users want to opt-out from
previously accepted privacy settings. We also found that
the protection methods users employ do not necessarily
tie up with the PETs offered by online service providers
and some of the methods practised by the users do not
prevent tracking at all. This paper touches on both sys-
tem and user aspects and synthesizes findings to present
an alarming disparity between privacy regulations, web-
site practices of presenting PETs in the real-world, and
how users learn about PETs and practice them. Such a
disparity sheds light on why current policies and prac-
tices are ineffective in supporting the use of PETs by
users. Our studies show that there is an urgent need to
address the gaps in this space, not only by researchers,
but also by the policymakers, service providers, and
PETs designers.
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A Top 100 EU Websites for Study 1
Table 5 lists the most used websites in the EU countries as reported by Alexa in Sep 2020.
no. Website no. Website no. Website no. Website no. Website
1 Amazon.co.uk 21 Www.gov.uk 41 Royalmail.com 61 Rightmove.co.uk 81 Virginmedia.com
2 Theguardian.com 22 Express.co.uk 42 Aruba.it 62 Tnt.com 82 Currys.co.uk
3 Bbc.co.uk 23 Euronews.com 43 United.com 63 Theoutnet.com 83 Topshop.com
4 Who.int 24 Oup.com 44 Next.co.uk 64 Selfridges.com 84 Chrono24.com
5 Google.co.uk 25 Search.yahoo.com 45 Bt.com 65 Johnlewis.com 85 Itv.com
6 Webex.com 26 Eset.com 46 Rte.ie 66 Thetimes.co.uk 86 Quidco.com
7 Edition.cnn.com 27 Britishcouncil.org 47 Tesco.com 67 Fxstreet.com 87 Easyjet.com
8 Dailymail.co.uk 28 Sky.com 48 Newsnow.co.uk 68 Dailystar.co.uk 88 Hsbc.com
9 Rt.com 29 Sap.com 49 Voanews.com 69 Asda.com 89 Sainsburys.co.uk
10 Asos.com 30 Mirror.co.uk 50 Childrensalon.com 70 Ucas.com 90 Riverisland.com
11 Cambridge.org 31 Weforum.org 51 Thelancet.com 71 Here.com 91 Macworld.co.uk
12 Ebay.co.uk 32 Metro.co.uk 52 Babyshop.com 72 Standard.co.uk 92 Serif.com
13 Reuters.com 33 News.sky.com 53 Argos.co.uk 73 Wipo.int 93 Harveynichols.com
14 Bet365.com 34 Jdsports.co.uk 54 Skysports.com 74 Gumtree.com 94 Yougov.com
15 Dw.com 35 Ubs.com 55 Channel4.com 75 Brownsfashion.com 95 Aeroflot.ru
16 Hm.com 36 Economist.com 56 Ryanair.com 76 Prnewswire.com 96 Nme.com
17 Ft.com 37 Espncricinfo.com 57 Irishtimes.com 77 Newscientist.com 97 Active.com
18 Telegraph.co.uk 38 Thomann.de 58 Advfn.com 78 Radiotimes.com 98 Indeed.co.uk
19 Independent.co.uk 39 Cosmopolitan.com 59 Siemens.com 79 Hotukdeals.com 99 Meltwater.com
20 Thesun.co.uk 40 Nhs.uk 60 Lyst.co.uk 80 Harrods.com 100 Nokia.com
Table 5. Top 100 EU websites
B Website Analysis Template for Study 1
For each website in our list, we followed these steps for our analysis:
– Step 1: Visit website: Open Google Chrome on laptop, clear browsing data via browser settings, visit the
homepage of the website.
– Step 2: Cookie notice: Observe if there is a notice (cookie consent, privacy settings, banner, etc.).
– No: Write it in the file.
– Yes: Observe the location and user control options e.g. OK, Accept, Yes, Reject, No, More Options,
Settings, Links to privacy-related pages, etc. Write your observations in the file.
– Step 3: Opting-out on the first visit: Try to opt-out from the cookie notice and count the number of
clicks. If not possible, write ‘NA’ in the file.
– Step 4: Opting-out of previously accepted cookies:
– Open Google Chrome on laptop, clear browsing data via browser settings, visit the homepage of the same
website.
– Accept the cookie notice. Close the website. Open it again without clearing the browsing history.
– Try to opt-out of previously accepted cookie settings and count the number of clicks. This can be either
via a privacy icon somewhere in the website or via privacy-related links at the bottom of the page. If not
possible, write ‘NA’ in the file.
– Step 5: Available PETs:
– Open Google Chrome on laptop, clear browsing data via browser settings, visit the homepage of the same
website. Click on all the privacy-related links and options and open them in new browser tabs. This can
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be via control options and links in the cookie notice, as well as privacy-related links at the bottom of the
page (e.g. privacy/cookie policy, interest-based ads, EU privacy rights).
– Parse the content of each page and look for privacy-enhancing options, tools and links. Continue clicking
on the related pages and open them in new tabs until all privacy pages are visited. Write all the observed
PETs in the file.
– For double-checking, search for the following keywords in these pages: ‘contact’, ‘browser’, ‘third party’,
‘Information Commissioner Officer’, ‘website settings’, ‘account’, ‘add-on’, ‘plug-in’, ‘mobile’, ‘app’, and
certain third parties and initiatives as listed in Section 3.3.3.
– Step 6: Further observations: Write any other observations about this website in the file.
C Questionnaires for Study 2
C.1 Demographics
What is your gender?  female  male  non-binary
What is your age?
C.2 Awareness of PETs
Privacy technologies, tools or features can protect from third-party tracking online (henceforth referred to as
PETs-TPT). Examples include browser settings or add-ons and plugins.
How did you learn about PETs-TPT?
Please select one of the options below or enter how you learnt PETs-TPT in the ‘other’ box. If you don’t
know about PETs-TPT, please answer ‘I don’t know’ in the ‘other’ box.
 friend / social contact recommendation
 work / school recommendation
 privacy/cookie policy of a website
 news
 other (please specify)
C.2.1 Use of PETs
Below is a list of technologies that can provide privacy protection online. Please indicate the one/s you currently
use specifically to protect from browser-based third-party tracking.
If you use a different technology or technologies, please name them in the other box. If you don’t use any,
please write NONE in the other box.
[We provide the list in compact form here for space reason.]  Firefox (builtin) Set Strict Content Blocking
 Safari (builtin) Set Prevent cross-site tracking  Chrome (builtin): Set Send Do Not Track Request  Chrome
Canary (builtin): Set Block third-party tracking  Internet Explorer (builtin): Set Send DoNotTrack Request 
Internet Explorer (builtin): Set Block Third-Party Cookies option or Block All Cookies option  Private Browsing
or browser incognito mode  Firefox Facebook container  Firefox Lockwise  Disconnect  Ghostery  AdBlock
 Adblock Plus  UBlock  Privacy Badger  DoNotTrackMe  DuckDuckGo plugin  DuckDuckGo browser
 Tor browser  Microsoft Edge  Brave  EPIC browser  Dooble browser  ungoogled-chromium  GNU
IceCat  StratPage  Encryption tools  Clear browsing history  Pseudonyms  Clear cookies or opt-out of
cookies  Switch off location tracking  HTTPS  Private social network  Proxy  IP Hider  Virtual Machine
 NoScript  Firewall  VPN  Password manager  Paypal instead of internet banking  Anti-Spyware 
Anti-Malware  Kapersky  Opt-out of receiving emails or newsletters  Google Analytics Opt-out add-on 
opt-out website: YourAdChoices - Youronlinechoices.com  opt-out website: optout.aboutads.info  Microsoft
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privacy dashboard  Flash player privacy settings  HTTPS Everywhere extension  CanvasFingerprintBlock/
Canvas Defender/ Canvas Blocker  Trace  Crumble  AdGuard  uMatrix  device/mobile settings/app
settings
D Participants’ Use of PETs in Study 2
Fig. 6. Participants’ use of PETs by technology type and how they learn about them (x-axis shows number of participants)
